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not to be abolished but controlled so that we have "(relatively) stable linguistic conventions, (approximate) fulfillment of a variety of relevant historical
conditions, and close (enough) correspondence between what the authors
intended to say and what they actually said" (p. 145).
The final three chapters might be thought of as applications. Chapter 8
argues that in the light of postmodern philosophy of science, religious experience can have evidential value for theological claims. Chapter 9 argues that
the social sciences have value presuppositions, that they require ethics as a
higher science to adjudicate those issues, and that ethics in tum requires theology as a higher science to adjudicate its disputes. The final chapter is devoted
to an analysis of supervenience and the non-reducibility of ethics to biology.
Drawing creatively on a wide variety of literatures, Murphy offers many
challenging claims deserving careful examination and wide discussion. But
the reader should not look for help in grasping the relation between AngloAmerican and French postmodernism. Here Murphy's massive erudition
fails her. Too dependent on secondary sources, she too readily passes on such
popular but insupportable claims as that deconstruction refutes itself (p. 60),
denies reference (p. 136, 140-41), and argues for a "total indeterminacy" of
meaning (p. 141). The latter would be the case, of course, if the onlyalternative to total determinacy were total indeterminacy, but that is just the kind of
modernist thinking Murphy herself repudiates in favor of meaning that is
"(relatively) stable". So on her own account it simply doesn't follow from
French arguments against total determinacy that the authors espouse total
indeterminacy.
A more helpful treatment would have asked: why is Anglo-American postmodernism so preoccupied with the question of justification and its criteria
while French postmodernism is not? No one, I think, can challenge that fact.
But how to explain it? Perhaps the solution is to be found in that heritage of
modernity that is most important to each side to preserve in some postmodern
form. Modem philosophy was about justification in large measure because it
was about critique. Anglo-American postmodernity asks the question: how is
justification possible after foundationalism? French postmodernism asks the
question: how is critique possible after foundationalism?
Critique and justification were essentially inseparable in modernity.
Perhaps they should be for postmodemity as well. Perhaps we should not
think with Murphy of Anglo-American postmodernity as a safer alternative
to the French versions but, to use one of her own phrases, seek "an integrating model" (p. 81) in which the two are, well, integrated.

Rush Rhees: On Religion and Philosophy, edited by D.Z.Phillips.
Cambridge University Press, 1997. Ppxxii and 389. Cloth $69.95
GORDON GRAHAM, University of Aberdeen
Rush Rhees is best known not because of his philosophical writings, but
because of his philosophical connexions. A student and friend of
Wittgenstein (later one of his literary executors), he became the teacher

BOOK REVIEWS

279

and colleague of a subsequent generation of Wittgensteinians-Peter
Winch, R. F. Holland and D. Z. Phillips notably. He published very little,
and virtually none on his own initiative. He left, however, voluminous
writings, and this book is an edited version of some of them.
There can be no doubt that it represents a prodigious work of editorship including, I imagine, a lot of deciphering as well as sorting, collecting and arranging. For this Phillips certainly deserves credit. But does he
also deserve thanks? This depends on whether the outcome is regarded
of special interest and enduring value. Interestingly, Rhees himself, it
seems, thought not. Phillips records in the Introduction that when
pressed about publishing some of his writings, Rhees said he had "nothing, absolutely nothing". In view of this remark Phillips understandably
expresses his considerable surprise that this "nothing" should turn out to
be 16,000 pages of script. But presumably Rhees knew full well the number of pages and meant, rather, "nothing of consequence." And it is by
this standard, his standard, that what is published here should be judged.
Philosophical consequence must be assessed in a context. I may have
written much and yet have nothing new to say if someone has said it
before me, or others have pursued the matter further. In the case of
Rhees, I am inclined to think, both of these conditions were satisfied. He
was a convert to Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy, and a very
good exponent of it. He was also, obviously, an inspiring teacher, partly
because of the sheer painstaking integrity of his intellect, and its transparency. But so inspiring was he, he transmitted, without residue it
could be argued, the heart and spirit of Wittgenstein, with the result that
those very able people who were inspired by it worked up the
Wittgensteinian philosophical method and style to maximum effect. One
outcome of this, however, is that between the originating genius of the
master and the explorations of the subsequent generation, there is little
room left for Rhees's own writings to occupy.
Anyone reading these papers who also knows the context cannot but
be struck by the regular recurrence of all the familiar moves and phrases. '"God exists' is not a statement of fact. You might say that it is not in
the indicative mood. It is a confession--or expression of faith ... If you
ask, 'Well, when we are talking about God, does our language not refer
to anything?', then I should want to begin ... by emphasizing something of the special grammar of this language" (p.49). "Some of your
trouble comes from thinking of Christianity and of belief in God as a
kind of theory" (p.127). "Can't philosophy decide whether there is a God
or not? If it were like that, the question would not have the importance it
has"(p.153). " ... you ought to have referred much more to examples.
This is the principal shortcoming all through your essay ... although
thinking of good examples is not easy" (p. 301). For Rhees there are few
errors or problems, but rather 'confusions' and 'puzzles'.
We have heard all this before, many times, not least from Phillips. So
striking is the similarity of language, that in reading the pages presented
here, the thought 'so that's where it came from' is impossible to resist.
Nor, I suppose, would Phillips, who himself has done much to make
these thoughts and moves a familiar voice in philosophy of religion,
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want us to think otherwise. But the question naturally arises: is there
any special point in hearing it again?
It is striking that much of what is published here is taken from
extended letters and exchanges, and a great deal appears in the form of
notes, incomplete sentences and non-continuous prose. This is to be
expected if Rhees's writings are thought of as primarily comments, musings, queries and reflections. And so they ought. Close to his death
Rhees remarked, apparently, "Discussion is my only medicine. When
that is finished, so am Iff (p.xx). Now it seems to me that discussion and
conversation playa vital part in philosophy. To say this, however, is to
observe that philosophy is an activity, one involving the engagement of
living minds and the pursuit of personal, shared, understanding. It is
not only this, of course. Part of the point, and often the outcome, of such
discussion and conversation is the formulation of a point of view into a
more finished form which admits of publication and is thereby laid
down for future generations. But not all writings, even highly considered ones, should be thought of in this way. Some, many perhaps, are
part of the preparatory conversation, and take their point, and life one
might say, precisely from this context. To put them in print is to freeze a
living thing, to attribute to them a nature that they do not have and cannot bear. On reading this volume, it is hard to resist the thought that this
is precisely what has happened here.
It is highly understandable that those who learnt so much from Rhees
should want others to learn from him also. Now that he is dead, and has
left so many pages behind, it is tempting to suppose that there is to be
found preserved in them the thoughts, insights and stimulus that students and other admirers found in his conversation. This, no doubt, is
why Peter Winch, before he died, concurred (in the publishers blurb)
with Phillips's view that the material in this volume stands "clearly head
and shoulders above anything being written in contemporary philosophy of religion". But there is a mistake here, and not one of estimation.
Conversation is essentially an exchange. What we cannot do with this
book is ask it questions, and yet this is what every page invites: How do
you mean? Tell me that again? But surely ... ? Precisely this is impossible, however, because what is presented to us is not the living voice, but
the fixed and final page.
Usually great philosophers are contributors both to the contemporary
conversation which constitutes the activity of philosophizing in their
own day and to the repository of texts which constitutes its enduring
residue for future generations. Sometimes, however, despite having
taken little part in the conversation, they leave us with writings of great
interest and importance. Most ordinary philosophers, by contrast, simply contribute to the conversation. More rarely the contribution of great
philosophers, or at least specially talented ones, is simply being a voice
in the conversation. This, I am disposed to think, is the case with Rush
Rhees. And in case this remark is thought of as a slighting judgement, I
should add that it is true of Socrates also. Plato, however, wrote for
Socrates. Phillips is not here writing for Rush Rhees. He is giving us conversations. These cannot but be distorted, and perhaps devalued, by
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publication. As Rush Rhees himself believed, I think. That Rhees was a
very considerable philosopher who had an important and continuing
influence on the subject need not be in doubt. What is in doubt is
whether that influence can be captured, or served, by publishing his literary remains.

